Cover Oregon vs. Oracle Corp.
Most public institutions ... by that I mean government institutions, are generally quite proficient at the operation, management and support of complex IT infrasructures. It is not that often that the definition, contracting, resource planning, project management and delivery of large IT initiatives such as Cover Oregon is thrust upon them. As such, the mind set, let alone the internal expertise to successfully implement such systems is generally not up-to-par.
That, of course is the raison d'être for SIs, at least the good ones. They constantly live (and die) for large, intricate development and integration projects and therefore are able to supply the high level of specialized expertise and methodologies necessary for project success. Neither the State of Oregon or Oracle, as far as I can see, had the ability, either practically or contractually, to act as a sytems integrator for Cover Oregon. Consequently, a lot of the critical design, management and implementation details were missed (or ignored).
Cover Oregon was a mission critical project that from Day 1 was under heavy public scrutiny, budgetary pressures and punishing deadlines. It appears that responsibility and, most importantly, accountability was not properly articulated at the outset in the design and contractural obligations phases.
Cover Oregon is a poingent reminder to all organizations contemplating large, mission critical, public facing IT initiatives: "Buyer beware of your own ability to screw things up" (D. Henschen).