FAA Seeks Safety in Numbers

Trendspotting Although businesses in aggregate have reduced the average time it takes them to complete financial closes and consolidation, many businesses could still stand to improve. Ventana Research reports that companies describing themselves as "heavy users" of spreadsheets in the closing process take longer to close than others. Ventana recommends reducing spreadsheet use for closing and consolidation by as much as possible, but says complete elimination of spreadsheets is nearly impossible and probably infeasible.

Commercial airlines in the United States haven't experienced a major fatal crash in more than three and a half years, but probably not because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has adopted advanced data analysis techniques in its oversight program. Although the idea of monitoring safety through data-driven risk analysis is universally supported by the FAA, the Department of Transportation (DOT) — which monitors it — and the airline industry itself, the FAA has in many ways poorly executed the idea. That's the conclusion of the DOT Inspector General's (IG's) office.

What's wrong with the FAA's execution will sound painfully familiar to readers in any sector: Old data, inflexible systems and limited intelligence sharing. For example, material financial information about airlines shows up in the FAA's Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) six to seven months late. And when risk factors are updated in SPAS, inspectors might not know unless they happen to request the right data. What's worse, when inspectors do receive such information, they don't often change their inspection priorities.

"Inspectors for only one of the five network air carriers we reviewed changed their annual inspection plans even though major changes were occurring at all five," reports the IG. The FAA's newest surveillance operations system won't allow a reduction of routine inspections when new risks force additional investigations. Therefore, inspectors are reluctant to identify new risks because they'll be saddled with more work than they can complete. (The FAA can't afford to hire more inspectors.)

The FAA points to the safety record as evidence that its data-driven approach is not as ineffective as the IG indicates. What's more likely, the IG counters, is that the industry's own data-driven risk management and newer aircraft are responsible for the safety.
— Jeanette Burriesci